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Explaining Peru’s recent political instability poses serious intellectual challenges. In less than 
fifty years, the country has gone through three distinct political periods (1968-1980; 1980-
1990; 1990-20002), each profoundly different from the others in economic, social and 
political terms. All three have reshuffled the social and economic contexts and the political 
and institutional arrangements prior to their advent, and none has achieved consolidation.  
Why has Peru displayed such high levels of instability?  
 
This paper aims at understanding Peru’s recent political trajectory, and more specifically its 
failure at democratic consolidation. By the beginning of the eighties, when several Latin 
American countries entered a period of democratic transition, Peru seemed to stand a better 
chance than most at consolidating a democratic regime: it had not gone through a 
bureaucratic-authoritarian experience, as had Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil or Chile3; its society 
did not have to confront the traumatic memories left by high levels of repression and State 
terror characteristic of Southern Cone regimes; the military, although discredited, never faced 
the accusations Argentinean or Chilean officers did; and the ‘reconciliation problem’ was not 
as high on the agenda as in the other countries.  
 
Peru did confront economic problems by the beginning of the eighties, but at the time these 
never appeared unsolvable. The transition process itself started relatively smoothly and the 
constitutional assembly elected in 1978 to decide on the rules of the game was surprisingly 
inclusive: although Acción Popular abstained from elections, a moderate Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), the long term enemy of the military and the elites, 
controlled 35.3% of its seats, while the left as a whole won a respectable 29.4% and the right, 
represented by the Christian Popular Party, obtained 23.8%.4  As a result, the constitutional 
                                                 
1 The author would welcome comments on this paper: abril1959@yahoo.com.                                                                                                                                                                           
2 The third moment’s beginning date could be contested. The change of the institutional rules only began in 
1992 when Fujimori closed Congress and called for elections to form a new Constitutional Assembly. The new 
constitution was approved by 1993. However, these explicit institutional changes can only be understood in 
relation to the political outsiders’ consolidation in the 1990 presidential campaign. This is why the paper deals 
with the third moment from 1990 onwards.  
3 The label “bureaucratic authoritarian” (BA) was coined by Guillermo O’Donnell in 1978 to describe a type of 
“authoritarian state” whose main features were the following: 1. Its social basis was the transnational 
oligopolitical bourgeoisie; 2. Specialists in coercion and technical personnel were the main groups commanding 
institutional decisions; 3. the BA stood as a system of social popular exclusion of a previously mobilized sector 
and as a regime of political citizenship suppression; 4. it stripped the political character of social demands 
transforming them into technically neutral problems; and 5. it closed down institutional mediations with social 
organizations, specifically the popular ones. (Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Reflections on the Patterns of Change in 
the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State’, Latin American Research Review 13 (1978), no. 1. 
4 Nicholas Lynch, Una tragedia sin heroes. La derrota de los partidos y el origen de los independientes. Perú 
1980-1992, Lima: Fondo Editorial Universidad Nacional de San Marcos, 1999, p.137. 
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text represented a “legitimate settlement” between political contenders,5 and apparently 
definitively sealed the deep and till then entrenched enmity (the “Difficult Game”, according 
to some)6 – between the military and APRA. 
 
Although the latter scenario seemed auspicious for a successful democratic transition, in 1992 
Alberto Fujimori, a political newcomer, undertook an autogolpe, swiftly closed Congress 
and, only under international pressure, called for elections to form once again a national 
constitutional assembly to legitimize his moves. Although the regime resulting from the new 
constitution was not a military dictatorship, it was far from being a democracy. The president 
took possession of more and more powers, and little by little, by nominating friends and close 
advisors to high ranking positions, turned Peruvian institutions into a clique at his personal 
service. Surprisingly, till nearly the end of the nineties, the authoritarian initiatives of the 
president had very high levels of approval from Peruvians of all social conditions. 
 
How can it be that a country that twenty years ago had probably better chances than most of 
the Southern Cone Latin American countries to embark on a successful democratic transition, 
underwent from 1992 onwards an involution that culminated by the year 2000 in a political 
debacle? How did the Peruvian democratic regime, born of a relatively inclusive 
constitutional pact, turn twelve years later into an authoritarian one-man show?    
   
Before spelling out the main thesis that tackles the above questions, this paper brie fly 
summarizes the conceptual map that helped organize the information and articulate its central 
argument. 
 
 
1. Conceptual option: from constraining legacy to agency and misfortune  
 
First, this paper rejects the culturally authoritarian approach. From such a standpoint, 
Peruvians are historically inclined (or worst, destined) towards authoritarian solutions 
because the country’s history has been plagued by military coups and the APRA, its main 
political party, although with an electoral majority, has been kept out of power through the 
intervention of the Armed Forces. Moreover,  both major historical actors (the military and 
APRA) have consistently shown little respect for democratic rules and procedures. With this 
history of repeated coup experiences, and such political attitudes, small wonder the 
Peruvians, in the nineties, massively supported Alberto Fujimori, a neopopulist with 
authoritarian inclinations. From this perspective, the preference for “Savior Figures” is not an 
episodic political phenomenon but “part of the Peruvian political culture”. 7  
 
Although the historical argument is descriptively correct – the neopopulist authoritarian 
character of Fujimori is obvious and there are continuities of style and political 
                                                 
5 Henry Dietz, ‘Elites in an unconsolidated democracy: Peru during the eighties’, in John Higley & Richard 
Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.247. 
6 According to Collier and Collier , following O’Donnell, in the Argentinian case “the proscription of Peronismo 
set up a situation in which the vote–getting strategies of the main political parties led inexorably to unstable 
governments (given that Peronism alone could have won 35 to 40% of the vote)…”. In the Peruvian case, 
between 1956 and 1968 the military imposed restrictions to full participation of APRA, leading not to an 
impossible game like in the Argentinian case, but to a difficult one (Ruth Collier & David Collier, Shaping the 
Political Arena, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, p.692).  
7 John Crabtree,  ‘Neopopulismo y el fenómeno Fujimori’, in John Crabtree & Jim Thomas (eds), El Perú de 
Fujimori, Lima:  IEP and Universidad del Pacífico, 2000, p.68.  
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intermediation between him, Haya de la Torre, Velasco Alvarado and even García – it has an 
implicit circular ring: there is enough empirical evidence to prove that history repeats itself. 
However, why does it repeat itself? And why and how, even when social and economic 
changes are underway, does it continue to repeat itself?8  It is precisely this question, left 
unanswered by the cultural perspective, that this paper wants to tackle.    
 
Another theoretical interpretation argues that democratic transitions are very highly inclined 
to fail in countries where a landowner elite, engaged in labour repressive agriculture, still 
dominates the economy and the political arena, and plays a major role in the export sector.9 
However, Peru does not fit this predictive explanation. By the end of the sixties, agriculture 
only represented 16.3% of Peruvian exports, while the fishing industry amounted to 25.6% 
and the mining sector 55%.10  Moreover, by the eighties, the traditional landowner elites had 
been swept away by the Velasco Alvarado agrarian reform. Why, with no landed 
authoritarian oligarchy, could Peru not consolidate a democratic regime?  
 
A third school, the “path dependency” one,11 seems the most appropriate to explain Peru’s 
recent political trajectory. This approach argues that institutional arrangements and political 
and social constellations prior to a transition determine to a high degree the path leading 
towards change and the tasks and challenges faced by relevant actors to consolidate 
democracy. Authoritarian regimes (like the Peruvian one) can embark on a transition through 
a reforma-pactada process leading rather quickly into at least competitive elections. The 
reforma-pactada opens its way when soft liners (moderates from the military and the civilian 
side) ally themselves and direct the transition towards democratic arrangements.  Once the 
regime transition is triggered, the process can lead into democratic consolidation, involution 
or stagnation.  
 
In the Southern Cone, according to Linz and Stepan, transitions started from authoritarian 
regimes led by the military.  In such cases, research on transitions should focus on the 
dynamics of the civil-military. As already mentioned, Peru does not belong to the same type 
of military regime. However, the Peruvian military have played a major role in the country’s 
political history and hence civil-military relations are also crucial to understand its trajectory 
from 1978 onwards. 
According to these authors, the transition’s outcome depends on how the alliance sustaining 
the transition evolves and on the interaction between five arenas – political society, civil 
society, economic society, rule of law and state bureaucratic capacities12  – and its 
corresponding actors. The latter behave and plan within economic environments that may or 
may not become propitious to a democratic consolidation. 13  
                                                 
8 Most countries come from an authoritarian past but at some point, through a combination of strategic choices, 
social and economic institutional arrangements, and good luck ( fortuna in O’Donnell and Schmitter´s words, 
1987), they face the option of breaking the pattern. Why don’t they take it?  
9 Terry Lynn Karl & Philippe Schmitter, ‘Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe’, 
in International Social Science Journal, vol XLIII, no. 2 (1991), pp. 269-285. 
10 Carlos Contreras & Marcos Cueto, Historia del Perú contemporáneo, Lima: IEP and Pontificia Universidad 
Católica del Perú, Universidad del Pacífico, 2000, p.292. 
11 Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South 
America and Post Communist Europe, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
12 For a definition of the five arenas, see Linz & Stepan (1996), pp.8-11. 
13 More specifically, the economic context, as Linz and Stepan argue,  does not produce immediate effects on 
democratization. Hence, “the question of whether an aspiring democracy can withstand economic difficulties 
…depends to a great extent on the degree of noneconomic system blame and mass-elite perceptions about the 
desirability of other political alternatives… Economic crisis will tend to lead to democratic breakdown in those 
cases where powerful groups outside or – more fatally— inside the government increasingly argue that 
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Because of time constrains, this paper focuses its attention specifically on the evolution of the 
soft- liners’ alliance and on the mutual impact and articulation among the civil and political 
societies and State capacities. The history of these arenas and of the alliance determine to a 
high degree the involution or evolution of three dimensions crucial to democracy: political 
alternation and competition14, participation15 and protection16. Political alternation and 
competition qualify the performance of political society, while participation expresses itself 
though the vitality or paralysis of civil society and its capacity to affect political society. 
Finally, protection depends on State capacities and the rule of law and, in the Peruvian case, 
more specifically on the military reactions to Sendero Luminoso’s challenge and their relation 
with civil governments. 
 
Hence, this paper tackles the central questions raised by the path dependency school – how 
did the prior institutional, political and social arrangements in Peru affect the road of 
transition; who, from the spectre of social and political forces, constituted the soft liners 
alliance sustaining the transition; what kind of civil-military dynamic surrounded the 
transition and the new regime; and how did the relevant actors in the social and political 
arenas respond to the tasks and challenges left by the previous regime and affect the 
participatory, protection and alternation dimensions of democracy. 
 
As can be inferred by the latter set of questions, more than searching for strict laws of 
causality, research focuses on characterizing the trajectory. From this perspective, the course 
taken by a country depends on how the five arenas (civil, economic, political societies, rule of 
law and State capacities) and their relevant actors constitute, change and interact among 
themselves, and determine the performance of the alternation, participatory and protection 
dimensions of democracy.  Emphasis is thus attributed to agency.    
Apart from these general considerations, the following paper assumes that authoritarian as 
well as democratic transitions and regimes might lead to different outcomes in terms of state 
consolidation, and the strengthening of political and civil society; and thus to the evolution or 
involution of the alternation, participatory and protection dimensions. Neither the arenas nor 
the dimensions necessarily move synchronically.  However, democratic consolidation 
presupposes an improvement of the performance of the three dimensions. Such an outcome 
stands a better chance when there is a positive sum game among the arenas: when the state,  
political, economic and civil societies, and the rule of law act to strengthen and complement 
each other in a democratic direction. Contrariwise, when the state gains power but society 
weakens and political society stagnates, democratic consolidation is a more unlikely 
outcome.17  
                                                                                                                                                        
nondemocratic alternatives of rule are the only solution to the economic crisis.” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp.79-
81) In other words, in order to affect a regime, economic performance has to be mediated and interpreted by 
political and civil society. 
14 The degree of political alternation and competition can be deduced from the following indicators: mechanisms 
of partisan elite selection, party relations, presidential rotation, formation of parliamentarian majorities, 
programmatic alternation. (Research Proposal: Democratic Sustainability in the Andean Region, Comparative 
Research Group, IEPRI-UN, 2001). 
15 The levels of participation can be inferred from: definitions of citizenship (who can participate); consultive 
mechanisms, popular mobilization, agendas, public policy (Research Proposal, 2001). 
16 The dimension of protection refers to the guarantees to civil, social and political rights and respect for ethnic 
diversity. It takes into account human rights violations, and labor, ethnic, and protest regulations. (Proyecto de 
investigación, 2001).  
17 Alfred Stepan, ‘State power and the strength of civil society in the southern cone of Latin America’, in Theda 
Skocpol, , Peter Evans & Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Bringing the State Back In , Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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The main argument of this paper is that in the Peruvian case the positive sum game between 
the arenas and actors never coalesced, making democracy a very improbable outcome. The 
lack of mutual reinforcement and the disjointedness between arenas was the result of: a) 
unfortunate decisions and choices taken by relevant actors in the political and social arenas; 
b) the impact of events that could not be foreseen during the transition (i.e. the rise of two 
antisystemic actors, Sendero Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru); 
and c) unintended political consequences resulting from the lack of synchrony between the 
political and social arena and the State.  
 
The paper follows a synchronic narrative and is divided into three periods: the military 
authoritarian-reformist regime (1968-1980); the failed democratic attempt (1980-1990); and 
the rise to power and consolidation of a plebiscitarian authoritarianism arrangement under 
Fujimori’s leadership (1990-2000).  In each of these, efforts will be made to emphasize the 
disjointedness between the political and civil societies and the State, and the lack of 
synchrony among the participatory, protection and alternation dimensions of democracy.   
 
 
2. The Velasco Alvarado ‘surprise’:  reform, national populist discourse and social 
mobilization 
 
Peru, vis a vis the Southern Cone countries that inspired most of the literature on regime 
transitions, does not fit the pattern. While Argentina, Brazil and Chile suffered repressive 
authoritarian regimes obsessed with order and political cleansing, Peru during the same 
period was under military control, but the regime was the opposite of  those inaugurated in 
the South. The southern cone regimes were directed towards demobilizing the popular 
sectors, repressing the left, sweeping any traces of armed rebellion and shrinking the role of 
the Populist State. By contrast, in 1968, the Peruvian Revolutionary Government of the 
Armed Forces, headed by General Velasco Alvarado, aimed at consolidating a State-centered 
economy and polity which would eradicate “the structural causes of social injustice”. 18  If the 
military regimes of the South intended to sweep away the legacies of prior populist regimes, 
the Peruvian military seemed engaged in founding a populist State whose social base would 
be made up of organized popular sectors, and whose historic mission was to defeat the landed 
oligarchy. Hence, the military government of Peru was out of step and out of touch with the 
political programme inspiring other contemporary Latin American military institutions. It had 
more affinities with the Peronist government of the forties or the discourse of General Vargas 
in Brazil in the fifties.  
 
To understand such temporary divergence from other military regimes in the region, three 
factors have to be taken into account. The first relates to the fact that APRA, the major 
populist force in Peru, although hegemonic in the electoral scene, has never been able to win 
the Presidency and each time it had an electoral chance, the military blocked its rise to 
power.19 Hence, although Peru’s political scene had resonated in the thirties with the typical 
                                                                                                                                                        
Press, 1985; Ana María Bejarano, ‘Para  repensar las relaciones Estado, sociedad civil y regimen político. Una 
mirada conceptual’, Controversia, CINEP, Bogotá, no.167, october-november 1995, pp. 9-32 . 
18 Contreras & Cueto (2000), p.309. 
19 In 1945, Bustamante, a presidential candidate, made the legalization of APRA and APRA´s participation in 
the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN) a condition for accepting his nomination. The FDN won an impressive 
two thirds of the vote. APRA provided the bulk of the popular support. During that period, APRA had an 
absolute majority of seats in the Senate and also a working majority in the Chamber of Deputies. However, a 
revolt led by APRA in 1948 led Bustamante to outlaw once again APRA. On October 27, 1948 General Odría 
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populist discourse of the times, and although APRA displayed a high level of tight party 
organization and electoral success, the populists never won the Presidency. 
 
The second reason relates to the Peru’s economic structure. While other Latin-American 
countries had already implemented a model of industrialization through import substitution 
(ISI) by the sixties and were ready to try another modernization strategy, Peru’s economy 
lagged behind. The Belaunde government of 1963-1968 applied some ISI policies but with 
great moderation. The military thought the State should actively promote national 
industrialization with more stringent decisions.20 
 
The third feature that explains the lack of synchrony between Velasco Alvarado and the 
Southern Cone regimes has to do with agency.  In the sixties, while other military officials 
were being socialized into counterinsurgency security doctrines very much imbued by the 
West-East conflict, the Peruvian officialdom went to the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares, 
a military training institution, convinced that the country’s development and political 
stabilization and moderation would only be attained if substantial economic and social 
reforms were achieved. Because Acción Popular, led by Belaunde and in power from 1963 to 
1968, had failed to carry this out, the military-as- institution had to implement it. 
Paradoxically, in 1968 the military, the old time enemy of APRA, held a coup to undertake a 
programme very close to the one that had inspired APRA in the twenties, but which no longer 
did so (the party was positioned much more to the centre), and that had triggered profound 
elite reaction and fear.  
 
This was not the first coup led by military officers in Peru, but this time the Armed Forces 
were not reacting to APRA’s threat nor responding to the initiative of a military caudillo. 
Their move was not reactive but pro-active. For the first time, the military had a State and an 
economic programme to lead Peru out of underdevelopment and they acted at first much 
more as a party-backed-by-arms than as a caudillo- led organization.  
Once in power, the military quickly took the initiative. They abolished the 1933 Constitution, 
closed Congress, suspended elections, and wrote a Revolutionary Statute which was to 
regulate decisions and initiatives promoted by the Military Junta composed of commanding 
generals from the three services. This Junta was to designate a President for an unspecified 
time. Although authoritarian, the military neither undertook repressive actions nor persecuted 
parties and political elites.21  
 
On the economic front, the Velasco Alvarado junta nationalized strategic sectors thought to 
be needed for the industrialization of the country.  The petroleum industry, which was in 
foreign hands, was one of the first to be nationalized; then came the fishing, cement, 
transport, communication, mining, and fertilizing industries. In less than ten years, by 1977, 
50% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was in State hands. Simultaneously, Velasco 
Alvarado’s Government founded new institutions to respond to the new economic model.  
                                                                                                                                                        
carried out a coup that ended the Bustamante period and “launched eight years of intense repression of APRA”. 
As in 1932, when military officers were killed during  the APRA uprising in Trujillo, APRA’s  disloyal tactics 
triggered a military reaction. In 1962 the military once again staged a coup to bloc APRA’s  rise to power 
(Collier and Collier, 1991; Alain Touraine, La parole et le sang. Politique et société en Amérique latine, Paris: 
edition Odile Jacob, 1988). 
20 Contreras & Cueto (2000). 
21 Contreras & Cueto (2000); Julio Cotler, (1986): “Military Intervention and “Transfer of Power to Civilians ” 
in Perú” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp.148-172. 
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The ministries of fishing, mining and energy, industry, tourism and construction were created 
during those years.22 
 
Less than a year after the coup, on 24 June 1969, ‘Indigenous Day’, the military launched one 
of the most profound agrarian reforms in Latin America. 39.3 % of cultivated land was 
distributed by 1982, benefiting 30.4% of rural families.23  Although the reform was not a 
success from the standpoint of agrarian production, productivity or rural earnings, it did 
change the social and political structures of the country. Till then the landowner elite had 
blocked all possibilities for reform through its over-representation in Congress. Although a 
minority, this elite had a powerful veto on the State’s political agenda.24 The reform policy of 
Velasco uprooted the agrarian elites and showed the State to be capable of imposing its 
decisions even on the traditionally powerful. During those years, the State developed such a 
high degree of autonomy vis a vis economic and political elites that some analysts even 
termed it a Bonapartist type of regime. 
 
From the political dimension, although parties were not banned, Velasco Alvarado’s 
administration tried to construct direct corporativist mediation with social sectors, especially 
with workers’ and peasants’ organizations.  It instituted a National System of Support for 
Social Mobilization (SINAMOS25) that was thought to guarantee the support of these sectors.  
By 1974, the government even approved a law encouraging social ownership, an initiative 
that led economic elites to declare that Peru was undergoing a Yugoslavianization process.  
With growing dissent expressed through the media, Velasco Alvarado decided to close or 
expropriate several newspapers, giving the regime a more authoritarian character.26 
 
Although neither massive repression nor state terror were used to control the political arena, 
governmental initiatives did have the intention of weakening party mediations and 
strengthening the direct link between the State and popular social sectors. However, even 
with a national-populist discourse, social and economic reforms underway, and paternalistic 
state spending via SINAMOS, the Velasco Alvarado politics of cooptation failed. With no 
electoral activity, an archipelago of left parties dedicated themselves to promote social 
organizations relatively autonomous from the State, and APRA maintained its hegemony 
over its own worker and peasant unions. Even organizations supported by the State did not 
acquiesce to policies implemented from the top down. 27  The suggestion is that corporativist 
strategies have more chance of success in contexts where labour movements and political 
parties are still incipient or weak, which was certainly not the case for Peru at the end of the 
sixties and seventies.  
 
Moreover, spurred by the populist discourse of State elites – its calls to the people and its 
explicit offer of a better future – the social movements entered into a cycle of mobilization 
that gained momentum when the economy ran into trouble.28 By 1975, the military junta led 
                                                 
22 Contreras & Cueto (2000). 
23 Cardoso & Helwege, ‘El populismo, el despilfarro y la redistribución’, in Rudiger, Dornsdusch & Edwards, 
Sebastian (eds), Macroeconomía del populismo en América Latina, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1992, p.80. 
24 Enciclopedia Universalis, Volume 12, Paris: Enciclopedia Universalis France, second edition, 1973. 
25 Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social 
26 Cotler (1986). 
27 Cotler (1986), p.154. 
28 Although numbers are not the only indicator of social protest – there can be a national general strike that has 
more political implications than dozens of small and disarticulated stoppages — it must be said that if between 
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by General Velasco Alvarado was isolated from economic elites who felt threatened by the 
socializing measures and the agrarian reform it had adopted; and also from the popular 
sectors. In contrast with other populist strategies implemented in the forties and fifties, like 
the Peronist one which successfully constructed a cohesive party that survived the 
Argentinean Bureaucratic Authoritarian (BA) regime, Velasco Alvarado’s was unable to 
forge long lasting  links with the labour and peasant movements. Although it behaved as a 
government and controlled state resources, it never transformed itself into a partisan force.  
 
By 1975, populist tampering with the economy led the country into one of the worst 
economic crises of the Twentieth Century. 29  As with other populist leaders, Velasco 
Alvarado fell victim to “the delusions of economic invulnerability” and the mistaken belief in 
the total “elasticity” of the economy. 30 Hoping for new oil findings and a rise in mineral 
prices, Velasco Alvarado postponed adjustment measures. By 1975, “no one was defending 
the Peruvian Revolution except the armored division.”31 In August 1975, Velasco Alvarado 
was forced to resign and General Morales Bermudez was appointed head of state by the 
commanders of all three forces.  
 
Although a new head of state was appointed, the isolation of the military-as-government 
continued and all initiatives to form coalitions either with social movements or parties failed.  
At the beginning of 1977 Morales Bermudez officially called for elections for a Constituent 
Assembly. However, this announcement did not appease the labour and social movements 
who, with the economic crisis deepening, called for a national stoppage. The government 
reacted by allowing employers to dismiss union leaders and workers on strike.  
 
Pressed by the critical social and economic situation, Morales Bermudez desperately sought 
support from the parties, and specially from the military’s old-time enemy, APRA. APRA 
was a cohesive organization which had programmatic affiliations with the reforms 
undertaken by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.  
 
Their length of time in power and the difficulties faced by the Junta simultaneously created 
more and more cleavages amongst the military: some wanted to defend the Velasco Alvarado 
revolution, while others had in mind the professionalization of the Armed Forces. The former 
founded the Partido Socialista de la Revolución (PSR); the latter wanted to protect the 
military-as-institution from a further erosion provoked by the military-as-government. They 
wanted the Junta to retire from government.  As General Morales Bermudez expressed in a 
1988  interview: 
Within the Armed Forces we had already began a process of internal 
politicization…The Armed Forces are NOT a political party that appears on the 
political scene, grows, and then dies. No, the Armed Forces are a permanent 
institution in the history of the nation and one has to defend it as a permanent 
institution. 32 
                                                                                                                                                        
1969-1972 there were 1505 strikes involving 494.500 workers and 26.4 million hours lost, in 1973-1975, the 
number rose to 2137 involving 1.396.100 workers and 49.4 million hours lost  (Lynch, 1999). 
29 Cotler (1986). 
30 Albert Hirschman,  ‘The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic 
Determinants’, in David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979, p.65. 
31 Cotler (1986), p.156. 
32 Philip Mauceri, Militares: Insurgencia y democratización en el Perú, 1980-1988 , Lima: IEP, 1989, p.15. 
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While a new constitution was being drafted, the military junta, on the verge of bankruptcy, 
accepted some of the adjustment measures demanded by the IMF.  This decision triggered a 
new wave of social unrest.  Hence, the gradual return to democracy, in the case of Peru, was 
lived in the midst of the mobilization and propagation of discourses on the left demanding a 
deepening of the social reforms started under Velasco Alvarado.  It was anything but a 
smooth transition, with a controlled hand over of power.  If the military did not back out of 
the process it was because of their internal divisions and public national and international 
discredit.  
 
In 1978, elections were held. Although Acción Popular and Patria Roja refrained from 
participating, the right, the centre and the left were all well represented in the Constitutional 
Assembly: the Popular Christian Party (PPC), the party of the bourgeoisie, obtained 23.8% of 
the votes; while APRA, with Haya de la Torre leading it, got 35.3%; and the left a substantial 
29.4%.33  Although the major Velasco reforms did not become part of the constitution, as 
APRA wanted: 
the vote was extended to illiterates and unanimous backing was obtained for a 
chapter devoted to human rights. Another of the important provisions 
strengthened the executive and gave it a presidential character in order to avoid 
the instability and paralysis that had contributed to the overthrow of the earlier 
Belaunde government.34  
 The following table succinctly summarizes the legacies that the military regime of the 
Docenio (1968-1980) left for the following ten year period, evaluating its democratic pros 
and cons. 
                                                 
33 Lynch (1999), p.175. 
34 Cotler (1986), p.167. 
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Table 1 – Legacies of the Docenio. 
 
Regime 
Type  
Authoritarian with the military-as-institution  in power but not anti-popular in nature. Failed corporativism, medium low levels of repression with 
control over the press and parties.  
Arena Actors Legacy Dimension 
Military  
Highly divided and politicized. Some profoundly Velasquistas (PSR); others, pro-professionalization of the 
Armed Forces.  
State 
bureaucracy 
Grew dramatically. By 1977, 50% of GDP was in public sector hands. Nationalization of strategic sectors: 
mining, fishing, oil, transport. 
State-society 
mediation  
Corporativism. Failed. The grass roots went further than the government that was supposed to represent them. 
Velasco Alvarado failed where Peron succeeded: he never was able to transform his following into a strong, 
cohesive party.    
State 
State rule over 
society 
Although regime was not massively repressive, with more and more explicit forms of social discontent, its 
authoritarian character became more evident. Leaders Persecution and media control.  
Balance  
· The high politicization of the military, its internal polarization, is a difficult legacy for democracy itself and for the 
institutional professionalization of the military.  
· “The size of the state sector is clearly not an indicator of state strength. Although the policies of the military increased the 
size of the state, it had not put into place policies that increased state capacities” (Mauceri, 2001:6) 
· Social movements’autonomy from state policy can be viewed as a positive democratic sign. However, in the Peruvian 
case, it also was part of a cycle of mobilization that was anti-State from sectors with low affinities towards a democratic regime. 
Although pro-popular in discourse, Velasco Alvarado’s political strategy did not increase State legitimacy. State capacity vis a 
vis the popular sectors did not increase. 
· State did display high levels of State autonomy vis a vis the economic elites, and particularly from the land-owners. In this 
sense, state capacity increased. Landed oligarchy defeated politically.  
· Disjointed strengthening: from the standpoint of certain dimensions –State-entrepreneurs relationship and control of the 
economy —State empowering but from others, i.e. the relationship with popular sectors, State’s intention of cooptation via 
corporatism, generated  an anti-State reaction, paradoxically within a very populist discourse. The balance of State, 
entrepreneurs, and popular sectors relationship turned into a no-win game: the strength shown vis a vis the elites did not 
transform into popular support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection: 
Medium low 
Political 
Arena Parties 
12 years without electoral activity. Left: highly divided but dedicated to popular organization. Some: loyal to 
economic and social democracy but not so towards political democracy. 
1970: Partido Comunista Peruano-Sendero Luminoso , division of the  PCP and of the Frente Estudiantil 
Revolucionario  in Ayacucho. 1978: goes clandestine and then in 1980 starts its armed fight.  
APRA: centre, PPC: right and AP: center-right. The latter three, pro-democratic. 
 
 
 
 
Alternation: 
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Balance 
Cons: No electoral experience for 12 years. Highly personalistic parties. Left:  some forces with no elective affinities towards 
political democracy. 
Pro: all the political specter represented in the political arena and, although AP and some minor left forces, abstained from 
participating in the Constitutional Assembly, all the political specter was represented. 
None  
Social 
Movements 
Strong peasant and labour movements, highly politicized from the left. High cycle of mobilization. Transition 
amid high levels of protest and strikes. From the government, discourse pro-rights a nd pro-people. Sense of 
frustration: offered betterment, and economic and social policies ‘did not deliver the goods’. By 1977, labor 
reforms and union repression. 
High Cycle of strike activity, with peak in 1977 
Civil 
Society 
Entrepreneurs  
Highly threatened. They felt that ‘their’ State and ‘their’ army could turn their back on them. Not consulted for 
economic policy decision making. 
Balance 
Pro: Strong popular organization. Internalized discourse on rights.  
Cons: Not all with elective affinities towards political democracy. 
On the entrepreneurs side, weak. No leadership. Disorganized. 
 
Participation 
Entrepreneur: 
Low 
 
Social Movts: 
High 
  
Soft Liners APRA-Military The old enmity between APRA and the military seemed over. Alliance between both sustained the transition. Dialogue also with PPC. 
Balance The ‘Difficult Game’ seemed over 
Economic 
Context 
Economic 
reforms 
Agrarian reform: although poor economic results, it swept away the land-owner elites. State enterprises: in 
strategic sectors but with poor economic results. Economic result of state non financial enterprises as a % of  
GDP:  1970: -0.52      1973: -4          1975: -5.26 
Balance 
Cons: Peasants were not better off than 12 years before. Rising unemployment: 
Urban unemployment:  1976: 8.4%       1977: 9.4%       1978: 10.4%     1979: 11.2% 
Economic model: not sustainable, deep imbalances. Total debt represented 45.4% of GDP in 1980. The current budget balance was 
for that year –6.2%. 
Cons: Economic difficulties could make visible the limits of political democracy 
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The years under military rule left a rather ambiguous legacy. The State, although bigger in size 
and having displayed high degrees of autonomy from the landowner oligarchy and the economic 
elites, did not achieve support from the popular sectors. From the protection dimension 
perspective, the State, although not massively repressive, did display authoritarian 
characteristics: it did selectively persecute opposition leaders and by the mid seventies, it closed 
or controlled the media. The military, after Velasco Alvarado’s regime, developed partisan 
linkages and  became highly divided among themselves.   
 
From a civil society standpoint, the Docenio  was a period where popular movements, NGOs, and 
social initiatives grew stronger.  Despite their numerical strength and activism, and although 
anti-Velasquista in nature and demanding a deepening of social and economic reforms, their 
political positioning was not always pro-democratic.  Politically, although there were no 
elections during the whole perio d and hence no alternation, Acción Popular and APRA were not 
decimated. The left dedicated itself towards organizing popular sectors and built strong links 
with peasant and labour movements. It is from such  a disjointed starting point – high levels of 
participation with medium low protection and no alternation – that  in 1980, after twelve years of 
military rule, elections were held. 
 
 
3. The Decenio: Blind shots  
 
As stated in the first section, the previous regime and the transition path that led Peru into 
democracy proved to be a rather volatile context in the eighties: the alliance between the military 
and APRA, thought to have overcome the ‘difficult game’ in which Peru had been caught for so 
long, eroded during the eighties;  the fact that the left, the right and the centre had political party 
representation and links with social organizations, was not enough to forge stable affinities 
between the parties and the electorate. The legacy that proved resistant to change was the 
economic one: civilians proved to be as ineffective as the military in managing the fiscal and 
debt crisis. Peru’s economic indicators worsened during Latin America’s ‘lost decade’, giving 
motives for social frustration and unrest.  In the following pages, three main points should 
become clear:  
· The soft liners’ APRA-military alliance: although effective in sustaining the transition, the 
alliance showed itself to be fragile when the situation returned to normal. The military became 
isolated from the Belaunde and the García governments, with traumatic consequences for 
democracy.  Memory weighed more than the rapprochement of recent times. Such a distance 
deeply affected the return to democracy because of an unforeseeable and ill- fated event: 
Sendero Luminoso opted in 1980 to fight through armed methods.  
· Macro economic policy making and political representation: Although entrepreneurs 
modernized themselves and became much more organized, no institutional mediations with the 
government were put in place. Economic Policy continued to be articulated in arenas 
impermeable to negotiation with national political or economic forces. Governments were not 
even backed by the elites, although under Belaunde the PPC, their close ally, was part of the 
cabinet. From the popular quarters, social mobilization was still high and although the left 
obtained good results in the municipal elections, it was unable to affect macro policy making. 
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APRA, the long term ‘people’s party’, also failed on the economic front. The living conditions 
of Peruvians worsened during the decade.  
· Partisan Affiliations and the Party System:  The mistaken economic policy choices of 
Belaunde and García worsened the social situation, affecting the relationship between parties 
and the electorate. What was thought of as a long lasting relationship between APRA and its 
electorate proved, under the circumstances, to be volatile. The left, in order to compete in the 
electoral arena, lived a short but fruitful period of unity (Izquierda Unida) that was highly 
effective at the municipal level. However, its success did not survive the nineties. AP, after 
Belaunde’s administration, was also electorally penalized.  Partisan affinities showed high 
levels of volatility, a situation that proved propitious for the arrival of outsiders. 
 
3.1. Civil military relations and Sendero’s challenge  
When Belaunde was elected President in 1980, an unfortunate coincidence accompanied his 
election: the Commander General was the same Colonel who 12 years before had collaborated in 
the coup that overthrew him. This fact triggered a sense of distrust that characterized the 
relationship between the Executive and the military during his whole mandate. 35 
 
Such distance would not have been so fundamental for the democratic future of Peru had it not 
been that at the same time a small left wing group decided to go into armed rebellion. With the 
glamour of guerrilla warfare fading in most Latin American countries (with the only exception of 
Colombia), Peru’s return to democracy was accompanied by Sendero Luminoso’s decision to go 
into armed struggle. Born in 1970 as a division of the Communist Party, by 1978, with the 
Constitutional Assembly drafting a new Charter, the group decided to become clandestine. Two 
years later, by May 1980, Sendero declared war on the Peruvian State in a rather conventional 
way – burning the ballot boxes of a few small Sierra villages. However, the way this guerrilla 
movement announced its presence in Lima some months later was a premonition of the rather 
gory methods Sendero was prepared to use in its armed struggle. Limeños found themselves 
waking up and finding dogs hanging from lamp-posts and red- lights with a message on their 
necks: “Xen Diaping, son of a beach”.36 
 
Although Sendero’s decision seemed totally out of step with the Peruvian and Latin American 
context,  its decision was the result of the following calculation, as Abigael Guzman, their leader, 
would explain in an interview years later: 
[The discrediting of the military] that was what we took into account. We also 
considered the situation of the new government – after 12 years in power, the 
military would not be able to launch a struggle against us nor go back into power. 
They were too discredited politically and had no prestige of their own. These were 
concrete facts.37  
                                                
35 Enrique Obando, ‘Las relaciones civiles-militares en el Perú 1980-1996: Sobre cómo controlar, cooptar y utilizar 
a los militares (y las consecuencias de hacerlo)’, in Steve Stern (ed.), Los senderos insólitos del Perú , Lima: UEP -
UNSCH, 1999, pp. 367 -374. 
36 Stern (1999). 
37 El Diario, 1988, cited by Mauceri (1989), p.25. 
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As the Table 2 shows, the guerrilla’s activities grew exponentially during the whole of the 
eighties, proving that the initial calculation of Sendero’s leader was at least correct during that 
decade.  By 1989, according to police sources, there were 3,149 guerrilla actions per year.  
 
Apart from discrediting the military, Sendero was able to grow because, instead of there being 
collaboration between the civilian government and the military, there was distrust and 
improvisation.  During his first two years’ mandate, Belaunde left the guerrilla problem in police 
hands. Then in 1983, when the military entered into anti-guerrilla warfare, they used anachronic 
tactics and manuals.  Moreover, neither the military nor the civilians had a global strategy. Each 
zone commander applied his own methods to confront Sendero.38 
 
Table 2  - Deaths as result of guerrilla confrontations (1980-1990) 
(Source: Nicolás Lynch, Una tragedia sin heroes, UN Mayor de San Marcos, 1999, p.164; Webb & Fernández (1995), cited by 
Martín Tanaka, Los espejismos de la democracia. El colapso del sistema de partidos en el Perú, 1980-1995, en perspectiva 
comparada, Lima: IEP, 1998, p.108) 
 
Total deaths during armed confrontation by victim 
Year  Total PNP FF.AA Civilians guerrillas.
Subversive actions 
registered by the 
Police/year 
1980 11   2 9 219 
1981 82 6  5 71 715 
1982 193 31 1 52 109 891 
1983 1969 52 9 682 1226 1,123 
1984 3588 56 26 1785 1721 1,760 
1985 1437 45 31 731 630 2,050 
1986 1376 100 29 466 781 2,549 
1987 936 139 53 403 341 2,489 
1988 1509 137 143 825 404 2,415 
1989 2878 229 109 1365 1175 3,149 
1990 3708 163 135 1531 1879 2,779 
 
 
That same year in Ayacucho, Sendero Luminoso’s original zone, General Noel Morales applied 
brutal tactics, including extensive disappearances and assassinations.39  He justified his choice 
with the argument that: 
It is very difficult to know whether it is Sendero alone who is acting or whether it has 
the support and collaboration of the whole left. It is difficult to distinguish because 
although some proclaim to have an electoral strategy different from the violent 
option, all are to blame for their irresponsible opposition to the government.40  
It has to be said that there were commanders who had a different approach to the whole problem: 
more than repression, they wanted to win over the population with social public spending and 
civic actions.  However, as the Belaunde Government was facing a serious fiscal crisis, it ended 
by giving its support to the hard- liners. On top of this, civilians, instead of debating the anti-
                                                
38 Obando (1999). 
39 Obando (1999). 
40 Mauceri (1989), pp.41-42. 
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guerrilla strategy with the military, left it on its own. Without political leadership, the anti-
guerrilla policy amounted to a series of disarticulated initiatives. 41 
 
During the García mandate, things did not go better. García did have a more proactive attitude 
vis a vis the military.  He showed more concern about the systematic violation of human rights 
that was going on and forced several officers to resign from their posts. Simultaneously, and 
inspired also by a deep distrust of the military, he began the wrong cooptation policy:  instead of 
winning over the Armed Forces as an institution by giving it a more prestigious space in his 
government and establishing a regular channel of communication with it, he began tampering 
with the politics of internal promotions and retirements. Such intrusion divided the military 
between the higher ranks, loyal to APRA and García, and the lower ones. The latter founded 
their own organization,  COMACA (Commanders, Majors & Captains), and by the end of 
García´s government were planning a coup. 42 
 
Both policies (human rights (HR) and promotions) blocked the possibility of articulating a State 
anti-guerrilla strategy.  The military, deeply hurt by the HR denunciations and scandals, refused 
to act, making it easier for Sendero to expand.  By 1988, the situation was critical.  To the latter 
military grievances a new one was added: the economic crisis was affecting military salaries and 
some units lacked food and military supplies.43 
 
The municipal campaign of 1989 and the Presidential one of 1990 went on amid everyday 
guerrilla actions (on a mean of 8.6 actions per day in the first year). Sendero not only attacked 
police and military posts. Lima suffered recurrent blackouts. Popular leaders who did not 
become activists of their own organization were treated as arch political traitors and assassinated 
without mercy.  Caught amid State repression and terrorist guerrilla actions, many social 
movements lost their leaders or became deeply divided. Under the armed pressure of left and 
right, “third options” (i.e. social organizations that were neither guerrilla nor pro-status quo) 
began withering away during the decade.44  For many analysts, Sendero was from the outset not 
a guerrilla but a terrorist organization imbued with the self-assigned mission of salvaging 
Peruvians – even if those who supposedly were to be saved did not endorse their methods nor 
agree with their political programme. Even worse: by the end of the eighties many had the 
impression that the whole of society was under siege from a totally disloyal actor and that the 
institutions, even those which had been founded to protect citizens, were unable to stop the 
terror. 
 
3.2. Macro economic policy making, economic efficacy and institutional mediations 
Terror and HR violations were not the only problem assaulting Peruvian society after a decade of 
democratic alternation. On the economic front, democratic institutions were not ‘delivering the 
goods’. If the unemployment rate (UE) did not vary substantially during the decade, the figures 
                                                
41 Obando (1999), p.379; Julio Cotler, ‘Descomposición política y autoritarismo en el Perú’, in Gabriel Murillo 
(ed.), Hacia la consolidación democrática andina. Transición o desestabilización,  Departamento de Ciencia 
Política, Universidad de los Andes, 1993, pp.205-230.  
42 Cotler (1993). 
43 Obando (1999). 
44 José Luis Rénique, ‘Apogeo y crisis de las terceras vías. Mariateguismo, Guerra popular y contrainsurgencia en 
Puno, 1987-1994’, in Stern (1999), pp.301-332. 
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for underemployment (SE) changed drastically as did those measuring  the adequately employed 
(AE).45 As these figures indicate, the numbers of Peruvians who were adequately employed 
plunged to a low of 18%, while underemployment rose to 73%. By the end of the eighties, most 
Peruvians were working less hours than wanted or more than 35 hours per week for less than the 
minimum wage, and as a whole they were earning less than before46. 
 
To make things worse, the inflation rates reached highs never seen before in the country (see 
Table 3).  
 
Table 3 – Peruvian inflation rates (1980 – 1990) 
(Source: Contreras & Cueto, 2000, p.345) 
 
Year Inflation rate Year Inflation rate Year Inflation rate Year Inflation rate  
1980 60.8 1983 125.1 1986 62.9 1989 2,775.3 
1981 72.7 1984 111.5 1987 114.5 1990 7,649.7 
1982 72.9 1985 158.3 1988 1,722   
 
As these figures prove, Peruvians saw their living conditions deteriorate during the democratic 
decade. Simultaneous to the fiscal crisis, public spending also went through drastic cuts that 
affected social public investment47. 
 
Beyond the populist discourse of Alan García, it was under his government that some labour 
reforms began being implemented. Short term contracts (STC) were allowed, leaving workers in 
a much more uncertain position. Nominal salaries were not indexed, and workers’ earnings, with 
hyperinflation on the rise, were highly affected. By 1988, there was a high peak of union 
protests, only comparable to the one of 1977-1978.48 However, even under a supposedly pro-
                                                
45 % of  PEA: AE, UE and SE  
Year AE UE SE 
1981 68 9 25 
1985 48 10 43 
1989 18 9 73 
(Source: Jim Thomas, ‘El mercado laboral y el empleo’, in John Crabtree & Jim Thomas, El Perú de Fujimori, Lima:  IEP and 
Universidad del Pacífico, 2000, p.262) 
46 Real wages 1980=100 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
100 110 87 97 78 33 
(Source: Institute for European Latin American (IRELA), ‘Perú y el futuro de la gobernabilidad: ¿Un nuevo comienzo?’, in 
Dossier no. 41, November 1992, p.64) 
47 Social Public Spending in education, health, housing and employment as % GDP, as % of Public Spending (PS) 
and as % per capita   Index  1970=100 
Year % GDP % PS  Per  capita Year % GDP %  PS Per capita 
1981 4.6 21.1 114 1986 4.7 21.7 105 
1983 4.2 16.9 85 1987 3.4 18 79 
1984 4.1 16.8 87 1988 4.3 26 77 
1985 4 16.7 84 1989 4.1 25 51 
(Source: Figueroa, Adolfo, ‘Distribución del ingresos y pobreza en el Perú’, in Crabtree & Thomas (2000), pp.241-242) 
48 Number  of strikes, workers affected and number of hour/workers lost 1979-1994 
Year # Strikes  # of affected workers # hours/worker lost 
1979 653 841 13411 
1980 739 481 17919 
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labour government, unions went unheard and protests revealed themselves politically 
ineffective.49 
 
On the entrepreneurial side, the eighties was a period of internal modernization. Different 
business associations made a conscious effort to build data bases, have their own economic 
analysis, articulate their own alternative economic policies and enter into technically argued 
debates with government officials. They even founded the National Confederation of Private 
Entrepreneurial Institutions (Confiep), 50 an umbrella organization conceived as an empowering 
tool to achieve better leverage vis a vis the government. But neither under Belaunde nor under 
García did they attain an institutional channel to promote their interests and participate in 
economic policy making.51  Finance ministers and the Central Bank did not agree to enter into 
negotiation with the business sector, and the PPC (the party closest to their interests), although 
represented in the Ministry of Industry under Belaunde, seemed as distant as the Finance 
minister.   
 
Under García, the tension and distance got worse. First, García tried financial solutions on his 
own terms: he unilaterally  decided  to cover only up to 10% of Peruvian exports per year of the 
country’s international debt. After his announcement, the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the World Bank reduced their credits. Then in July 1987, in his speech to Congress, he 
announced the nationalization of the banking sector. However, this time the financial sector 
staged symbolic protests and started de-capitalizing banks. García’s move, very popular among 
the left, was defeated.  By 1987, the business community found in Vargas Llosa an articulate 
leader to represent its grievances. A year later, Vargas with other politicians, was founding the 
Democratic Front (FREDEMO), an alliance among the PPC, Acción Popular, Movimiento 
Libertad and Solidaridad y Democracia (SODE).  
 
3.3. Party affiliation and electoral results 
As Linz and Stepan argue in their book on consolidation, economic troubles do not automatically 
translate into social unrest and democratic disaffection. 52 The worsening of living standards has 
to be explained, and there has to be someone or something held responsible for the deteriorating 
                                                                                                                                                        
1981 871 856 19974 
1982 809 572 22751 
1983 643 785 20300 
1984 509 702 13816 
1985 579 237 12228 
1986 642 248 16867 
1987 720 309 9068 
1988 814 693 38275 
1989 667 224 15223 
(Source: Lynch (1999), p.175) 
49 Thomas (2000), p.277. 
50 Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas. 
51 Catherine M. Conaghan, ‘ Capitalists, Technocrats and Politicians’, in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell & 
Samuel Valenzuela (eds), Issues in democratic Consolidation. The New South American Democracies in 
Comparative Perspective, Hellen Kellog Institute , University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, 1992, pp.199-243. 
52 Linz & Stepan  (1996). 
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conditions. In the Peruvian case, amid a growing anti-political discourse, it was the parties which 
took the blame.53 
 
According to Tanaka, the anti-political discourse, accompanied by a crisis of representation 
argument, exaggerated some of the difficulties faced by the Peruvian party system. 54 Against the 
representational crisis argument, Tanaka points out that the articulation between parties and 
social organizations was quite vigorous during the seventies and part of the eighties. Different 
left wing parties built strong bridges with social organizations,55 so much so that this relationship 
partly explains the failure of the corporatist policies undertaken by Velasco Alvarado towards the 
end of the sixties and the during whole of the seventies. APRA also had a preferential 
relationship with some labour unions.  
 
However, although social organizations and their partisan links remained active during these 
years, their members, as voters, started to electorally abandon the parties. The articulating link 
that went from individual to union or society member, to party affiliate, and finally to voter 
began to break. 
 
The combination of terrorism and economic crisis took its toll on party affiliation. As Table 4 
shows, APRA (PAP in the table), ‘The Historical Party of Peru’, obtained 53.1 % in 1985 
presidential election and only half of the votes (22.6%) in the 1990 first presidential elections; 
AP won the presidency in 1980 with 45.3 but by 1985 only represented 7.3%. The left did quite 
well in municipal elections – it obtained 23.3 % in 1980; 29% in 1983; 30.8% in 1986.  
However, in 1989 it began on a descent that would worsen over the coming years (20.2% in 
1989 and 3.9 % in 1993 municipal elections) .  
 
Considered separately, different motives explain the abrupt changes in electoral preferences for 
the Left (with IU first and then divided); the Centre (APRA), and the Right (represented by AP 
and then by FREDEMO).  Asked about the worst mistake Belaunde committed during his 
administration, Peruvians responded in May 1985 that it was his economic policies (50%) 
followed by corruption (16.9%) and terrorism (15.3%). According to an opinion poll conducted 
in 1989, the left lost electoral support as a result of personal rivalries (55%) and ideological 
discrepancies (34%); and García, who started with astonishing levels of popularity (80% in his 
first year, and 60% in the second), lost support in 1989 (11.4%) when inflation rates reached the 
astonishing peak of 2,775.3%. 56 
 
                                                
53 According to this discourse it is parties and politicians who are to blame for economic and social fiascos. Hence, 
solutions to problems should come from outsiders, men and women not contaminated by politics. Politics, from such 
standpoint, is a corrupt activity that worsens things.  The discourse also traces a moral frontier between “good 
leaders”, the new comers, and bad guys, the old politicians. 
54 Tanaka (1998). 
55 Confederación General de Trabajadores de Peru was hegemonized by the Partido Comunista Peruano, the 
Sindicato Unico de la Educación Peruana by Union Nacional de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, the Confederación. 
Campesina del  Peru by the Partido Unificado Mariateguista and the Confederación .Nacional  Agraria by the 
Partido Socialista Revolucionario. Unir was also strong amid student organizations and the PUM among poor urban 
neighborhoods. (Tanaka, 1998: 76) 
56 Tanaka (1998), pp.115, 137 & 156. 
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Table 4 – Voting % per party at municipal and presidential elections (1978 – 1990) 
(Source: Ly nch, 1999, p.175) 
 
Years AP PPC FREEDOM*  PAP Left** Cambio 90 Independent*** 
1978 (ca) DNP 23.8  35.3 29.4  11.5 
1980 (p) 45.4 9.6  27.4 14.4  3.2 
1980 (m) 35.8 11.1  22.5 23.3  7.4 
1983 (m) 17.5 13.9  33.1 29  6.7 
1985 (p) 7.3 11.9  53.1 24.7  3 
1986 (m) DNP 14.8  47.6 30.8  7.8 
1989 (m)   31.2 20.4 20.2  28.2 
1990 (pI)   32.6 22.6 13 29.1 2.7 
1990 (pII)   37.5 DNP DNP 62.5  
DNP: Did Not Participate 
(m): municipal elections 
(ca): constitutional assembly 
(pI) (pII): First and second row presidential elections 
* AP y PPC participated in 1989 and in 1990 allied with Movimiento Libertad in FREDEMO 
** The left in 1978 is the sum of FOCEP; UDP; PSR; in 1980, UDP; PRT; FOCEP;IU. Between 1980 (m) and 1986 (m) 
only as IU. In 1989, as the sum of IU  and ASI; in 1990 IU plus IS 
*** In this column independent parties and candidates. The high percentage in the 1989 (m) corresponds to Movimiento 
Obras. 
 
However, these results should also be read as a whole. The volatility of electoral preferences is 
also a consequence of twelve years of military rule. Although parties were not banished during 
that military docenio, electoral activity was suspended and electoral networks became dormant 
for more than a decade.  
 
Added to the suspension of elections, intra-party relations also played a part in explaining 
partisan disaffection. Recruitment patterns and candidate selection can be auspicious for the 
maintenance and reproduction of cohesive networks, or become an obstacle. Peruvian parties 
from all ideological shades displayed during the eighties “very personalistic patterns of political 
recruitment” with the jefes fundadores (founding fathers) as the main axis of partisan life. The 
presidential race overshadowed congressional elections, and when in power “presidents 
…display[ed] a strong tendency towards governing alone, without resorting to negotiations with 
their party organization or with their parliamentarians”. 57 
 
Hence, even with high levels of Cabinet-Party congruence58 and parliamentarian majorities 
supporting the executive 59, during the eighties politics was rather a lonely game.  When things 
                                                
57 Barry S. Levitt, ‘Continuity and Change in Peru’s Political Parties, 1985-2000’, Paper prepared for the 2000 
Congress of The Latin American Association (LASA), Miami, 2000. 
58 Classification of the Inauguration and Midterm Cabinets appointed in Perú  
President Cabinet/Party Congruence Cabinet Type 
Belaúnde 0.759 Tight coalition 
García 0.8 Tight single party 
Fujimori 0.287 Co-optation 
(Source: Octavio Amorin Neto, ‘Cabinet formation in Presidential Regimes: an Analysis of 10 Latin American Countries’, paper 
prepared for delivery at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Association, Illinois, September 24-26. 1998.) 
59 Peru: 1978-1985 % of Parliamentarian Seats  
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went wrong, the Jefe Fundador had to take the blame. As high ranking officials and middle and 
lower links played a secondary role in the decision making processes and electora l campaigns, 
they did not have much to lose by abandoning a party that was facing difficulties.  Moreover, 
with the growing audience for the anti-political discourse, many local leaders preferred to run 
under an independent banner, a preference stamped in the municipal electoral results60 and in 
interviews conducted with different politicians.61 
 
Finally, it was during those years that a new way of constructing bridges between politicians and 
the electorate became central: the media, with its own style and aesthetic, imposed its rules on 
candidates.  According to Martin Tanaka, the traditional parties had difficulties in adapting to the 
new circumstances and continued to rely on their relations with social movements and 
associations without perceiving that suc h links were already in crisis and could not guarantee 
good electoral results.  
 
In summary, a comparison of the legacies of the military regime with those left by the 
democratic decade (1980-1990) reveals an erosion of pro-democratic conditions as well as a 
worsening of the obstacles to democracy.  This is summarized in Table 5.         
 
The democratic years of the eighties left behind several outcomes:  
1. As the García years proved, civilian intervention in military matters does not always 
strengthen democracy. García’s intrusion in  military ascensions politicized and divided 
even more that institution. Under such circumstances, Sendero Luminoso expanded its 
territorial control. 
2. When the economy goes well, civil society’s participation in policy making might seem 
unimportant. However, when things go wrong, social movements and business 
associations can resent this fact and develop a sense of exclusion. Such sense of exclusion 
can translate into electoral disaffection. 
3. Postponement of economic adjustment policies made the Peruvian economic situation 
much worse.  During the democratic decenio, Peru’s room for economic maneuvering vis 
a vis international agencies seemed thinner and thinner.  
By the end of the eighties, the Peruvian State was larger but not stronger. Quite the contrary, the 
fiscal crisis affected it and the military became more and more internally divided, with some 
sectors even plotting coups. The State lost the monopoly of arms to guerrillas whose 
destabilizing power grew during this period. Eve n worse, the military, with a certain compliance 
from civilians, confronted the challenge applying highly repressive tactics. Paradoxically, with 
the return to democracy, human rights violations became part of the political agenda and the 
protection and guarantee of rights were probably lower than under the previous regime.   
                                                                                                                                                        
Years Elected President and Party affiliation First Party Second Party Intervalo puntos de %  
1980 Belaunde AP 54 AP 32 PAP 22 
1985 García APRA 58 PAP 27 IU 31 
(Source: Sistema de Partidos Políticos en el Perú, Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, 1994 and Fundación Friedrich Ebert) 
60 This is why the percentage of municipal independent mayors doubles the percentage of outsiders at the 
Presidential level. See table on voting percentages during the 1980s.  
61 Romeo Grompone & Carlos Mejia, Nuevos tiempos, nueva política. El fin de un ciclo partidario, Coleccion 
Mínima IEP no. 32, Lima, 1995, p.82. 
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Table 5 – Summary of the legacies of the democratic decade (1980-1990) 
   
Regime Type  
Disjointed Democracy based on alternation but with low levels of protection (Human Rights violations) and problems of translating participation into 
policy and representation.  
Arena Actors Legacy Dimension 
Military  
The lack of cohesion obstructs the articulation of a military strategy against SL.  The interference of the 
civilian government ( García) in retirements and promotions divides even more the military. Rumors of 
coups. Military isolated, with no political leadership in its antiguerrilla warfare.  Memory from past 
disloyalties weighed more and mutual distrust hindered the possibility of a joint State strategy of civilian 
and military forces.  
State bureaucracy 
“The state was larger by the García administration (1985-1990) than in the past, but its vulnerabilities 
reached a critical stage, as hospitals lacked medicines, teachers went unpaid, and military equipment was 
unusable due to a lack of spare parts.  Along with economic vulnerabilities, the actions of insurgencies in 
this period also had a nefarious effect on the organizational capacities of the state. Attacks against 
infrastructure, private companies, mayors and government officials throughout the country made the 
implementation of development programs virtually impossible.”  (Mauceri, 2001:6) 
State 
State rule over 
society 
Human Rights violations publicly denounced. State repression to contain Sendero Luminoso. 
Balance  
Current legacy (1980-1990): State was larger but weaker in terms of efficaciously accomplishing policies. Policies disconnected 
from civil society and parties. Sense of chaos and uncertainty provoked by  the high inflation rates and the inefficacious 
antiguerrilla warfare. Society felt unprotected and detached from institutional life. Public accusations of HR abuses from the 
military.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection: Low 
Political 
Arena Parties 
Organized but still inefficacious. Policy making: more a question of negotiating with International 
Agencies and advisors than with national organizations. Although parties were meant to accomplish a 
mediating function between State and society, they failed: economic and social policies were drawn by 
high ranking officials and the Executive but not through party mechanisms. 
The lack of institutionalization made parties highly vulnerable to economic and antiguerrilla fiascos. Little 
sense of adaptation to the media. By the end of the eighties electoral  indicators pointed at their lack of 
stable support. Politics as a “lonely game” of jefes fundadores.  Advisors displaced career politicians. Little 
incentives for middle link personnel to remain within a party. Jefes fundadores overshadowed other 
figures. 
Balance 
Current legacy (1980-1990): Weak and unstable partisan networks and affiliations. Highly volatile electorate preferences. Each 
party penalized after being in government. Little adaptability to the new circumstances (i.e. media). Left obtained good electoral 
results at the municipal level while united (Izquierda Unida) but by the end of the eighties plagued by internal divisions that 
weakened it.  
 
 
Alternation: 
High but 
High Voting 
Volatility 
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Arena Actors Legacy Dimension 
Social Movements 
Facing public spending cuts, new labor legislation, they had very little efficacy in affecting policy making. 
By the end of the decade, union affiliation descending. The cycle of mobilization was on the descending 
track. 
Civil Society 
Entrepreneurs  
They implemented internal modernization policies, built data basis, supported the formation of well 
prepared business representatives. Umbrella association. However, lit tle success in establishing 
institutional mediations with government policy making. 
Balance 
Current legacy (1980-1990): The strong activism of social organization was withering for lack of efficacy and because of new 
labor rules. Entrepreneurs modernized but no efficacy. Disconnection from government policy making. 
Participation 
Social movts: 
High 
 
Entrepreneurs 
Organized  
 
but both 
 inefficacious  
Soft Liners 
APRA-Military The institutional alliance between APRA and the military proved vulnerable and did not survive the 
transition. It was replaced by a cooptation policy of retirements and ascensions that divided the military 
and run against its professionalization.  
Balance 
Rumors of coups amid a strong challenge from Sendero Luminoso. Even if Peru did not go back to the same old Difficult Game 
between the military and APRA, political forces remained trapped in distrust and divisions.  
Economic 
Context 
Economic 
reforms  
Although unemployment figures stable, subemployment on the rise. With hyperinflation, salaries down. 
Social Public Spending down. 
Balance Current legacy (1980-1990): By  1990, total debt represented 76.3% of GDP. Inflation rate: 7,649.7% in 1990. 
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From a civil society, participatory perspective, social movements continued to show relatively 
high levels of mobilization. However, by the end of the eighties the cycle’s peak was over and 
the new labour and social conditions and polarization ambiance were taking their toll on union 
membership and social protest. From the entrepreneurial side, economic elites made efforts to 
strengthen their leverage over policy making with little success. Hence, government decision-
making processes were rather isolated from social pressures, either from the popular or the elite 
side. If during the Velasco Alvarado regime, the State displayed high levels of autonomy towards 
the economically dominant groups while it could not achieve the social support of the popular 
sectors; then during the democratic decenio, even with active party mediations, policy making 
became impermeable to all organized social groups. In contrast to the Velasco Alvarado ye ars, 
such State isolation from social and political forces was not articulated in terms of the realization 
of a coherent, Bonapartist-style State project, but instead it was the outcome of governments with 
no clear political direction or economic programme. 
 
 This lack of  political effectiveness from social organizations, plus the consolidation of the 
media as another form of political mediation, affected partisan loyalties. With the exception of 
the left, which showed good results at municipal elections, voting preferences drastically 
changed from one election to the next.  Levels of alternation between one election and the next 
were high. However, such a fact, instead of strengthening parties, was a sign of the fragility of 
partisan loyalties and lack of party institutionalization.  
 
By the end of the eighties, neither State power, nor civil and political society showed signs of  
democratically empowering themselves. On the contrary, regretfully all three arenas were 
weaker than at the beginning of the decade and social and political mediations between society 
and State were not accomplishing their linking role between social organizations and institutions. 
With the return to democracy, although alternation and partisan competition were high, 
protection was low and the degree of participation was still high but proved rather inefficacious. 
In such a context, it is small wonder an outsider opened his way through.  
 
 
4. Fujimori: Antipolitica at its best, or the rise of a new political breed (neopopulism + 
neoliberalism)  
 
As can be deduced from the latter period, the context was ripe for political ‘outsiders’. In the first 
row of presidential elections in 1990, Mario Vargas Llosa, the renowned literary celebrity, 
competed against Alberto Fujimori, an unknown engineer and university professor who ran his 
campaign with the short apolitical slogan of “honesty, work and technology”. Apart from these 
new comers, APRA had a candidate – Luis Alva Castro – and the left divided itself with Henry 
Pease leading Izquierda Unida (IU) and Alfonso Barrantes representing Izquierda Socialista 
(IS).  
 
As said before, Vargas Llosa stood for a drastic economic adjustment programme and was 
associated with the white Lima elites (los pichucos), while Fujimori, whose image was that of a 
hard-working self-made man, a son of migrants, was seen as representing the Cholo population 
of Peru, made of Indians, mestizos, and peasants recently migrated to the urban centers, all of 
whom felt discriminated against by the white elites.   
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During the first round of the 1990 presidential election, Vargas Llosa obtained 33% of the vote, 
while Fujimori 29% and  Castro 22%. The short distance that separated Vargas Llosa from 
Fujimori turned into a clear defeat for the former in the second round: Fujimori won by an ample 
majority, with nearly double the vote of his opponent.62  Without the backing of a stable party, 
this unknown university professor would become the President of the Peruvian people for the 
next ten years, would be reelected twice again as President and would display astoundingly high 
levels of popularity for most of the period. 63 With the electoral backing of most Peruvians and 
with their sympathy and approval, he led the country into a democratic institutional erosion 
whose negative consequences would only become fully apparent by 2001. How and why did he 
achieve this? 
 
4.1. Political preferences, new social mediation and a new political style 
Contrary to what is thought by many analysts, in 1990 not all the traditional parties had 
disappeared. In the Parliamentary elections held that year, APRA obtained 28% of  the total 
seats, while IU still represented 9%.  AP and the PPC, as part of the FREDEMO alliance, 
obtained  14% and 12% of the seats respectively. 64  
 
However, the high volatility of electoral preferences remained a fact. APRA went from a high 
56% of the seats in 1985 to 28% in 1990, a reduction which showed the penalization of the 
unsuccessful García government’s policies; IU went from a high 26% in 1985 to 9% in 1990, 
showing how the left’s divisions took its toll amongst the electorate; and AP rose from 6% in 
1985 to 14%.  These variations show how unstable political affiliations were in Peru when 
Fujimori rose to power. 
 
In contrast to García and Belaunde, who were backed by the majority of Congress, Fujimori with 
Cambio 90 could only count on 19% of the total seats. To the difficulty of having a 
parliamentary minority was added the fact that Cambio 90 was an electoral compromise among 
people who only had in common being friends or close advisors to the President.    
 
However, the President took advantage of this apparently negative fact. With his anti-political 
discourse 65 and his well trimmed  image of efficiency, he decided to close Congress on the 5th of 
                                                
62 Fujimori obtained 4.489.897 votes that represented 62%, while Vargas Llosa won 2.708.291 votes representing 
38% of the total. (Fernando Tuesta, Perú politico en cifras, 1821-2001 , Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 3rd edition, 
2001, p.497). 
63 Levels of approval  of Alberto Fujimori as President of the republic     
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1990        46 51 53 59 61 
1991 43 35 38 49 45 35 31 39 32 54 58 60 
1992 65 64 53 81 76 76 65 62 74 68 65 64 
1993 60 62 61 63 59 66 61 65 63 70 67 64 
1994 66 58 61 60 61 64 65 68 68 65 63 67 
1995 64 74 66 75         
(Source: Poll conducted by APOYO, cited in Lynch, 1999, p.175)               
64 Fernando Tuesta, Perú politico en cifras, 1821-2001 , Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 3rd edition, 2001 . 
65 The anti-political discourse places parties as the central “bad guys” responsible for historical catastrophes. 
Politicians are presented as corrupt, selfish figures who have driven countries into economic chaos. Against 
traditional politicians, the anti-political discourse argues that nations should be conducted by people who come from 
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April 1992 after a majority parliamentary block opposed the approval of an ensemble of special 
decrees to undertake the war against Sendero.  According to Fujimori, Congress was blocking 
the Executive and leading the country into an ungovernably chaotic situation. More 
emphatically, the President argued that it was Parliament which was obstructing the construction 
of the necessary legal tools to combat terrorism and the drug trade, and establish the correct 
policies to reactivate the economy.66  The Peruvians backed him, as the results of a March 1992 
survey show: while 42%  believed in the Presidency, only 12% had confidence in Parliament.  
 
How did Fujimori achieve such backing? Apart from the propitious political context, Fujimori 
developed his own political style and constructed his own personal mediation with Peruvians. 
Mimicking the electorate’s tastes and cultural expressions, “Fujimori used all the hats from all 
the regions of Peru; all the mining caskets; all the shawls, nearly all the sweaters, and he [was] 
even capable of nearly being everywhere for the happiness of the Peruvian people who 
perceiv[ed] him as their equal, a garage ‘chinito’ but with a university title”. 67  Moreover, he 
came up with an electoral slogan reminiscent of the best populist figures of the Latin American 
forties: “Fujimori: a President like you”. 68 With these populist communication techniques, the 
President produced a fusion between him and his following, not so much representing Peruvians 
but incarnating them. From his presidential campaign onwards, Fujimori was already announcing 
he would not rely on any political or social mediation to produce political governance. He, the 
man, like Gaitan in the forties,69 was himself Peru.  But in contrast with the major Latin-
American populist figures of the thirties and forties, parties and civil organizations were 
perceived by him as politically redundant. 
 
Added to this populist leadership style, Fujimori undertook several institutional initiatives which 
would concentrate power in the Executive Branch.  For example he created a Presidential 
Ministry in 1992 with access to State resources to be directly distributed by the Executive. While 
most Ministries saw cuts in their public spending, by 1994 the Presidential Ministry was running 
as much as 15% of fiscal state earnings.70  Parallel to this, two institutions specifically targeted 
on “the poor”71 were in place by the end of 1992: the National Fund for Compensation and 
Social Development72 and the National Programme for Food Aid (PRONAA73). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
OUTSIDE of politics and who have not been touched by its corruptions and short sighted methods. Entrepreneurs, 
media people, engineers, are all best choices than politicians. Politics is more a matter of  technically well grounded 
policies.    
66 IRELA (1992). 
67 Abelardo Sánchez, ‘Bucaram, Fujimori y Menem: los nuevos mosqueteros del poder’, in Quehacer no. 102, Lima: 
DESCO, July-August 1996, p.34. 
68 Carmen Rosa Balbi, ‘Del golpe del 5 de abril al CCD: los problemas de la transición a la democracia’, in Pretextos no. 3 -4 (1992) , p.51.  
 
69 Gaitan, the great populist Colombian leader, assassinated in 1948, proclaimed “I am the people!” following the 
populist route of avoiding intermediations between the leader and his followers. See Wills, ‘El Populismo: un 
péndulo entre la esperanza y la decepción de la s masas en América Latina’, Masters Thesis, University of Montreal, 
Montreal, Québec, Canada, 1992. 
70 Sinesio López, ‘¿Modernizando el Estado? El Estado peruano post-ajuste. La agonía del Dios mortal’ in 
Quéhacer, no. 93, Lima: DESCO, January-February 1995, p.60. 
71 It is not a casual coincidence that social categories such as labour, the working class or the unemployed were 
replaced in political discourse by such amorphous categories as the “poor”.  
72 Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social. 
73 Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria. 
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Figure 1 - Institutional Confidence 
(Source: Lynch, 1999, p.175 and press information of Latinobarómetro) 
23
57
29
26
42
54
60 63
20
45
19 19 17
44 42
27
17
21
13 13 12 13 11 14
17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Marz-
89
Sep-90 Marz-
91
Sep-91 Marz-
92
Sep-92 Sep-93 Sep-94 2001
Presidencia de la
República
Parlamento
Partidos Políticos
 
 
 
While these paternalistic and very personalistic programmes were put in place, labour reforms 
were pushed through: short term contracts (STC) were backed even more than before by a 1991 
Employment Law; different unions were allowed within the same sector, and when on strike 
workers would not receive their salary; the costs of dismissals were reduced while labour 
stability was replaced by protection against arbitrary dismissal.  By 1995, union affiliation had 
dropped to 13% and by 1998, more than 50% of the labour force was on a STC.  Strike activity 
went from 613 strikes in 1990, to 219 in 1992 to a low of 151 in 1993.74  
 
Within such a vulnerable context for organized labour, the paternalistic presidential programmes 
were viewed as beneficial. Long gone was the Velasco Alvarado period when the left with its 
anti-State discourse resonated among the popular sectors. After the eighties and the visible 
personalistic divisions amid these currents, Peruvians seemed disillusioned with anti-status quo 
discourses and were prepared to accept Fujimori’s paternalistic help.   
 
Against the corruption scandals that tainted the García Government, the Chinito also represented 
efficiency and transparency. Fujimori succeeded in discrediting even more the traditional parties 
and presenting himself as an entrepreneur who would lead the country out of the economic and 
political debacle. The Fujimoristas, following their leader, saw themselves, not as intermediaries 
but as executives efficiently following orders and technically and neutrally applying policies: 
the traditional politician only delivers the goods to his friends and family. We 
[Fujimoristas]: No! We go to the plaza, we have the Army with us…Make a line! 
Come on! Order! I do not even know the people, I do not even know their party 
affiliation. It doesn’t matter.  I only need to see a poor condition and that’s it: to all 
the needy, so and so, five kilos of rice to everyone. No exceptions. No privileging.”75  
                                                
74 Lynch (1999), p.175. 
75 Grompone & Mejía (1995), p.62. 
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As this quote reflects, compared to previous populist strategies, Fujimori’s policies, instead of 
being corporativist and targeted towards organized sectors of society (peasants’ associations, 
labour unions), were focused towards ‘the poor’, a disorganized mass of people with no concrete 
identity. In contrast to Perón in Argentina or Cárdenas in México, Fujimori seemed uninterested 
in co-opting these organizations and forming his own party. Instead, he wanted to concentrate 
power in the Executive Branch.   
 
However, not all Fujimori´s support can be attributed to pure image and glitter, and power 
centralizing strategies. Although during his campaign the President had spoken against a harsh 
adjustment package, once in power he applied stringent measures with relative success.  
 
As the Table 6 shows, the measures brought down inflation from a peak of 7,649.7% in 1990 to 
139.2% by 1991. Such results suggested to Peruvians that the President knew what he was doing 
and that economic planning, if done well, could channel market forces towards more predictable 
and certain futures.  In order to achieve this, Fujimori worked hand in hand with the Banco 
Central de la Reserva del Perú, whose Board of Directors applied constraining measures on 
money emission and exchange rates. By 1993, after a new constitution was approved, the Banco 
Central achieved its own organic law which guaranteed its autonomous management of  
monetary regulation.  In contrast with the past, its aim is first and foremost to preserve monetary 
stability. To such an end, the organic law explicitly prohibits the Banco Central from financing 
public sector investment. 
 
 
Table 6 – Inflation and GDP change during Fujimori’s  presidency 
(Source: Drago Kisic, ‘Privatizaciones, inversiones y sostenibilidad de la economía peruana’, in Crabtree & Thomas 
(2000), p.96; *Cuánto cited by Contreras and Cueto (2000), p.345) 
 
Year GDP Increase Inflation Rate 
1991 2.9 139.2 
1992 -1.8 56.7 
1993 6.4 39.5 
1994 13.1 15.4 
1995 7 10.2 
1996 2.8 11.8 
1997 4.5 6.5 
1998 5 6.0 * 
1999  3.7 * 
 
 
But the bringing down of inflation was also related to policies applied to correct fiscal 
imbalances and the generation of greater competitiveness. Only twenty years after the state 
centred model was applied by the Velasco Alvarado government to modernise the country, 
Fujimori dismantled this developmental option in a rather short time and applied a privatization 
strategy which gave the State a limited76 but welcome source of income.       
 
                                                
76 Limited in the sense that the State, once its sells, this source of income expires.   
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Table 7 - Most important privatizations by total sum sold (Millions of USD) 
(Source: COPRI (1998), Boletín mensual, Lima, cited by Alberto Pasco-Font, ‘Políticas de estabilización y reformas 
estructurales: Perú’, Serie Reformas Económicas No. 66, Organización de las Naciones Unidas, Chile, May 2000 ) 
 
Date Enterprise Sector Total sum Investment 
pacted 
28-02-94 ENTEL - CPT Telecomunicaciones 139177 1200 
17-10-95 EDEGEL Electricidad 524 42 
6/10/1994 Tintaya Minería  277 85 
18-04-95 Banco Continental Finanzas 255 - 
25-06-96 EGENOR Electricidad 228 42 
12/7/1994 EDELSUR Electricidad 212 120 
24-02-93 PETROMAR Hidrocarburos 200 65 
4/11/1994 Refinería de Cajamarquilla Minería  193 50 
14-02-96 SIDERPERÚ Industria 186 30 
11/6/1996 Refinería La Pampilla Petróleo crudo 181 50 
7/12/1996 ANTAMINA  Minería  20 2500 
7/10/1997 METALOROYA (Centromin) Minería  122 127 
28-05-99 Empresa Minera Pargasha Minería  62 70 
Total (1992-99)    9000 8600 
 
Between 1991 and 1998, the Peruvian State sold companies and investments for a total of USD $ 
8,650 million to mostly foreign capital. 78 This move also represented  the opposite of the 
developmental strategies followed by Velasco and the populist figures of the past.  Instead of 
relying on national investment, now the new economic winds proclaimed that poorer countries 
needed foreign capital in order to progress; and Fujimori, in Peru, was able, even against internal 
criticism, to successfully apply the new policies and convince Peruvians that such moves were 
necessary to generate employment and wealth. 79  
 
How successful was the whole economic strategy in social terms? Or to frame the question 
differently, how much glitter and circus was involved in Fujimori’s opinion approval and how 
much was his massive support based on real success? During the nineties private investment 
augmented considerably and inflation rates were curbed.80  However, other figures suggest a less 
successful outcome. For example, although unemployment did not rise, underemployment 
reached  worrying heights;81 in 1994, wages in the private sector only represented 60% of those 
                                                
77 According to Cueto and Contreras, the Peruvian Telephone Company was sold for USD 2 million. 
78 Spanish capital bought USD 2,398 million which amounted to 29.97 % of the stock of foreign investment; 
followed by the USA with USD $1,798 million amounting to 20.98%; GB capital invested USD $ 1,461 million 
corresponding to 17.05%. Source: CONITE cited by Contreras & Cueto (2000), p.355.  
79 Carmen Rosa Balbi, ‘El Fujimorismo: una delegación vigilada’, in Pretextos, no. 9, Lima: DESCO, 1996, pp.187-
224. 
80 % of investment / nominal GDP: 1991: 16.7, 1992: 16.2,  1993: 18.5,  1994: 22,  1995: 24.3,  1996: 23.5,  
1997: 24,  Kisic (2000), p.92.   
81 % of  PEA adequately employed (AE) unemployed (UE) and subemployed (SE) 
Year AE U SE 
1990 20 9.5 71 
1991 15 8 80 
1992 14 10 78 
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earned in 1985; and although the Presidential Ministry was conceived and put in place during the 
Fujimori’s first term in office, Social Public Spending suffered cuts as the next table illustrates: 
 
Table 8 - Social Public Spending in education, health, housing and employment as % GDP 
and Public Spending (PS) and per capita index 1970=100 
(Source: Banco Central de la reserva del Peru and INEI cited by Figueroa (2000), pp.241-242) 
 
Year % GDP % PS Per Capita 
1990 3.4 19 33 
1991 3.2 24 31 
1992 3.7 27 36 
 
Undoubtedly the least successful impacts of the economic package were attenuated by the 
Chinito’s trips, paternalistic spending policies and communication strategies.  But Fujimori´s 
support also relied on the weaving of a relaxed network of friends and advisors appointed to high 
ranking State positions. Amid such connections was, of course, his crucial alliance with the by 
now famous Montesinos. 
 
4.2. The alliance in power: Montesinos-Fujimori -Hermoza 
Apart from the paternalistic policies and his own personal style, Fujimori appointed Montesinos 
as the director of the National Intelligence Service (SIN)82, an obscure ex-army man with a 
dubious past. Through him, the President built up a privileged relationship with officers whose 
primary credentials were their loyalty towards him. Following the path of his predecessor, 
Fujimori guaranteed that the Executive would intervene in military promotions and retirements 
through the Legislative Decree 752 of 12th November 1991. The military also depended on the 
Executive branch for such central matters as budget and salary decisions. Through these 
institutional arrangements, Fujimori warranted the subordination of his most important ally – the 
military.  Rather than forming a party, the President relied heavily on the military to remain in 
power. Montesinos, through the SIN, began controlling the Army.  His own men infiltrated the 
institution, which fell more and more under his supervision. It was also Montesinos who brought 
General Nicolas Hermoza into the alliance. By December 1991, several generals were forced 
into retirements, while Hermoza was designated General Commander  of the Armed Forces.83  
 
But the Army’s loyalty was ensured not only through methods of vigilance and  extortion but also 
through quid pro quos of another nature: the military received all the backing it needed from the 
Executive to defeat Sendero.  Till then the military had been seen as either highly ineffective or 
as dangerous to democracy and civil powers. Fujimori on the contrary backed them entirely and 
gave them a free hand to undertake their anti-guerrilla campaign. As with the retirement and 
promotions strategy, Fujimori used institutional measures passed under García. Law 24150 of 
June 1985 established that territories declared emergency zones would be under a Politico-
Military Command (PMC) presided over by a military officer designated by the President from 
names suggested by the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. By November 1991, legislative 
                                                                                                                                                        
1993 13 11 79 
1994 17 9 72 
(Source: Thomas (2000), p.262) 
82 Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional  
83 Obando (1999). 
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decree 749 amplified the PMC functions, to the point that the high ranking officers in the 
emergency zones became “the real government” displacing civilian and State authorities.84 
Fujimori, using such institutional arrangements, declared more and more regions under military 
control.  
 
Table 9 – State of Emergency (1981-95). % of national territory affected. 
(Source: Lynch (1999), p.165). 
 
Year Population Territory 
1981 1.84 1.20 
1985 6.04 7.25 
1990 45.18 29.62 
1991 55.87 39.24 
1993 49.66 27.71 
1995 44.27 22.14 
 
Simultaneously, it became easier for the Judiciary to declare a penal process to be a military 
matter. On the 8th of February 1994  Law 26291 was approved. From then on, by simple majority 
the Supreme Court decided whether a process would go to a civilian or a military court.85 
(Obando, 1999).  Finally, on November 1992 decree 077 created the Civil Defense Committees 
(CDC). Such institutions had as their primary aim to “develop self-defense activities, counter 
terrorist actions …and support the Army and the Police”. By January 1993, decree 002 gave the 
Rondas Campesinas thirty days to transform themselves into CDC under military surveillance. 86  
 
The Rondas were very peculiar Indian-Peasant self-defense groups, which had first 
spontaneously organized against theft and petty crime, and then against Sendero Luminoso 
incursions. Although autonomous of the State, by 1988 Alan García’s government had decided 
to legally recognize them as self-organized groups whose primary aim was to eradicate common 
crime from their region.  However, as Sendero Luminoso expanded, the Rondas became more 
and more involved in the war, and by the time of Fujimori’s election they were part of the anti-
guerrilla strategy of the armed forces.  
 
Curiously enough, the free hand given to the Army came when this institution was evaluating the 
poor results of the repressive strategy it had first applied to defeat Sendero: instead of applying 
massive Guatemalan-style terrorist methods to control civilians, the Army was prepared to start 
civico-military campaigns and win over the population to its side. Although weakened and 
deprofessionalized at the national level by Fujimori’s cooptative methods, at the regional one the 
Army became stronger: “In emergency zones, certain military leaderships were able to construct 
close relations with the Rondas. The Rondas, in the Sierra, [became] closer to the Army than to 
the Parties”. 87  
 
                                                
84 Carlos Reyna & David Montoya, ‘En Nombre de la emergencia. Fuerzas Armadas: un poder en varias 
dimensiones’, in Quehacer, no. 88, March-April 1994, Lima: DESCO, pp. 26-31. 
85 Obando (1999). 
86 Reyna & Montoya (1994). 
87 Obando (1999); Rénique (1999). 
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The Army did not only play a role in the war against Sendero but was also a crucial ally of 
Fujimori during election times: in 1994, a year before Fujimori’s reelection, there were between 
200 and 370 thousand Peruvians organized in CDC. These were mobilized for the indirect 
intervention of the military during elections.  Although it cannot be said that Sendero was 
comp letely defeated under Fujimori, 88 the military strategy, backed by the government, proved 
relatively successful:  
 
 
 
Table 10 - Total deaths  registered in subversive and counterinsurgency actions by victim 
(Source: Lynch (1999), p.164) 
 
Year Total PNP FF.AA Civilians Subvers. 
1988 1509 137 143 825 404 
1989 2878 229 109 1365 1175 
1990 3708 163 135 1531 1879 
1991 3044 213 174 1282 1375 
1992 2633 197 199 1303 934 
1993 1187 96 85 535 471 
1994 615 20 61 253 281 
1995 500 38 92 203 167 
 
 
 
Table 11 - Parlamentary Results, 1995-2000 
(Source: Tuesta (2001), p.456) 
 
List Seats  % total voting 
C-90 Nueva Mayoría 67 51 
Unión POR el Perú 17 14 
APRA 8 7 
Frente Ind. Moralizador 6 5 
CODE/País Posible 5 4 
AP 4 3 
PPC 3 3 
Renovación 3 3 
Obras 2 2 
IU 2 2 
Frente Popular Agrícola del P. 1 1 
Perú al 2000 / FNTC 1 1 
Mov. Independiente Agro. 1 1 
Total  120  
 
 
                                                
88 Eduardo Toche, ‘¿Regresa Sendero?’, in Quehacer no. 102, July-Aug 1996, Lima: DESCO, pp.30-35. 
  
32
Table 12 - Presidential Elections National Results 1995 
(Source: Tuesta (2001), p.444) 
 
Candidate List Total votes % 
A. Fujimori C-90 Nueva Mayoría 4.645.279 64 
J. Pérez de Cuellar Unión por el Perú 1.555.623 22 
M. Cabanillas APRA  297.327 4 
Alejandro Toledo Code/ País Posible 234.964 3 
Ricardo Belmont Movimiento Obras 175.042 2 
Raul Díaz Canseco Acción Popular 121.872 2 
E. Ataucusi FREPAP 56.827 1 
A. Haya de la Torre Izquierda Unida 41.985 1 
 
Such results are the outcome of  Fujimori’s strategies, his alliance with the military, the relative 
success of his economic and anti-guerrilla policies and also the traditional parties’ response: 
APRA and Accion Popular, arguing there were not the conditions, refrained from participating in 
elections for the Constitutional Democratic Assembly  in 1992. This meant they were out of  the 
political scene from 1992 till 1995.  Apparently this decision had its costs in electoral terms. 
Added to this was the fact that the García and Belaunde governments were considered total 
fiascos from the economic and anti- terrorist dimensions.  
 
Fujimori remained in power till the alliance that sustained him began to crumble. First came 
General Hermoza’s resignation under corruption charges; then came the spectacular down fall of 
Montesinos. After winning the presidency for a third time, under international and national 
pressure he was forced to resign. He left Peru institutionally weak and facing the challenge of 
rebuilding a robust party system and approving, once again, a new set of rules to govern the 
country.  
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Table 13 – Summary of legacies of Fujimori regime. 
 
Regime 
Type: 
Plebiscitarian Authoritarianism: Executive backed by alliance with the military and electoral and opinion poll support with populist style mediations 
with citizenry but no corporativist strategy. Instead paternalistic antipoverty focus programs distributed by the Executive. Congress and Judicial Branch 
subo rdinated to the Executive.  Military: allied but not as institution but though promotion and retirements with loyal officers in high ranking positions.  
De facto powers: Clique of friends and loyal advisors in high ranking positions leave Judicial and legislative branch inoperative.  
Arena Actors Legacy Dimension 
Military Backed by the Executive through legal arrangements. Applied a civico military strategy to win over the 
Rondas. Achieved good results in the terrorist front at the expense of civil liberties and political rights. 
However, the military received the backing of Rondas. Although powerful, the Army remained 
subordinated to the Executive Branch. 
State 
bureaucracy 
From a State centered model to a neoliberal one. Important privatizations and international investment in 
strategic sectors. Executive branch: centralized powers. Paternalistic and focalized programs towards the 
“poor”. Distribution through populist style.  
 
 
 
State 
State rule over 
society 
Peru, on a 1 (most free) to 7 scale of Political Rights and Civil liberties, scored 5 for PR and 4 for CL and 
was considered Partly Free in 1996 Freedom Review, 1996:17. Same score in jan.  2001, Journal of 
Democracy, 2001: 90-91 
Balance  Although there were no mediating links that allowed social organizations and entrepreneurs associations to participate in 
economic policy making, opinion polls demonstrate that when there are relatively good results such lack of articulation does 
not translate in political disaffection.  The paternalistic programs and the newly created Presidential Ministry insured popular 
support to Fujimori.    
 
 
 
Protection: Lower 
Political 
Arena 
Parties The antipolitics discourse plus the institutional arrangements designed by Fujimori took their toll on 
traditional parties. By 1995, such was their lack of support that they did not even obtained the require 5% 
to keep their status. Fujimori, although applying populist techniques, did not organize a party nor applied 
corporativist strategies towards organized sectors. Opinion polls and his alliance with the military seemed 
an efficacious tool to remain in power.  
Balance Bankrupt parties with very low levels of popular support. Independents grew stronger and became the mediating link between 
institutions, Fujimori and the citizenry. 
 
Alternation: 
elections without 
parties 
Social 
Movements 
Even weaker than before. Unions: low affiliation. Labor reform left even more unprotected workers. Low 
cycle of protest and mobilization.  
Civil 
Society 
Entrepreneurs High levels of international investment. If negotiation with Peruvian Business not through parties, nor 
parliament, but negotiation “behind closed doors” 
Balance Participation through opinion polls and elections but no organized expression of interests though social, union or business 
organizations 
Participation 
Organized Low 
But high electoral 
and opinion poll  
Eco. 
Context 
Economic 
reforms 
Banco de la Reserva: autonomy and control over monetary politics. Privatizations with high levels of 
foreign investment. Labor reforms : flexible STC. Employment uncertainty.  
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Conclusions  
 
To recapitulate the main findings of this research, during the military regime (1968-1980) Peru 
followed a State-centered model based on Import Substitution, with relatively weak party 
mediations but strong popular social organizations, and little attention paid to international 
economic agencies; in other words, the State became larger but did not receive stronger backing 
from civil society. Although the regime was not highly repressive and protectio n was on a 
medium low range, participation was high on the popular side while it was low in the business 
quarters; however, this mobilization could not express itself in the electoral field as elections 
were suspended during the whole period (medium low protection + no alternation + high levels 
of popular participation while low from business). The corporativist alternative put in place by 
Velasco Alvarado to replace party mediations failed. Simultaneously, the high levels of 
participation from social movements were not always pro-State or pro-democratic.  
 
Once the transition started, it was led by the ‘soft liners’, moderates within the military and 
APRA organization, an alliance that was hoped would end the historical enmity between the two 
fundamental pillars of Peruvian nationality. However, during the Decenio (1980-1990), the 
alliance that had sustained the transition eroded under the entrenched distrust between Belaunde, 
García and the military, all three incapable of surmounting old memories of mutual betrayals. 
Such distrust blocked the possibility of articulating an efficacious state strategy to face the 
challenge posed by the terrorist tactics of Sendero Luminoso, a guerrilla war that became public 
in 1980.   
 
During the democratic decenio (1980-1990), amid a deepening of the fiscal and debt crisis, the 
State was still large and also still quite ineffective. Although political society was active and 
elections were held with high levels of alternation, ill- timed decisions from political leaders and 
a new mediation between parties and the electorate (the mass media) produced  a highly volatile 
electorate. Added to this, the internal structures of the political parties were not auspicious for 
the strengthening of affiliations and political loyalties: the  executive tended to control decisions 
and to become isolated even from parliamentarians belonging to the President’s own party. 
Although popular social movements continued to mobilize and protest and business associations 
organized themselves to have better leverage over government decisions, neither were successful 
in winning influence over public decision-making processes. Impermeable to social pressures, 
when the leader’s decisions worsened the economic context the electorate began searching for 
new figures, outsiders who strongly criticized parties and offered miracle solutions. Hence the 
return to democracy in the Peruvian case did not imply a better leverage of social organizations 
over policy making, partisan programmes, or state structures; nor did it mean a improvement in 
the human rights record of the country. On the contrary, the democratic come back was 
accompanied by a more visible and public denunciation of human rights violations.  
Paradoxically, levels of protection were lower than when the military were in power, while 
alternation and competition was high and participation, although high, was seen as inefficacious.  
 
In such a context, an outsider managed to break through and in a rather short time established a 
plebiscitarian authoritarian regime accompanied by a neoliberal package of adjustment that 
considerably diminished the role of the State and gave the market a central place. He was 
successful in his political strategy thanks to his style, his paternalistic policies, the institutional 
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arrangements he engineered from the executive and his reliance on his alliance with the military. 
Added to his political play, was the fact that other mediations were weakened: neither parties nor 
unions and other associations were strong enough to oppose the President’s moves. Participation, 
no longer expressed in street and plaza mobilization, found its way through opinion polls and 
elections. However, voting, with the military playing an active and vigilant role in the electoral 
rituals and parties being on the verge of bankruptcy, more than expressing individual preferences 
among different political options, became a plebiscite in favor of the Chinito.  From the 
protection dimension, although the Armed Forces abandoned massive persecution and relied on 
civico-military campaigns, the record of human rights violations was far from being democratic. 
With low levels of protection, low levels of alternation and a rather ‘delegative’89 participation, 
Peru seemed further from a democratic arrangement than in 1980.  
 
The  Peruvian trajectory suggests that major changes are affecting the way the citizenry 
articulates itself towards state institutions and the political arena. The ideal liberal model of 
representation (individual ?  voluntary social networks (unions and business associations) 
? ?partisan mediations ?  elections ? ?State policies) is suffering deep transformations. The 
traditional social mediations of the Import Substitution Model (union and business) have lost 
their relevance and leverage over parties and policy making. Simultaneously the electorate 
organizes its preferences, more and more according to the media, opinion polls and the leader’s 
political style, and less and less through solid long term partisan loyalties. The representation and 
articulation of social interests through social organizations, parties, and parliamentary debates, is 
being displaced by direct (but ephemeral) contact between the leader and his followers. 
  
Moreover, the new model of representation left by Fujimori depends on strong leaders, a 
powerful executive, a weak parliament and volatile partisan affinities. Although it has 
resemblances with the populist regimes of the thirties and forties, it also displays major 
differences: the new leaders do not rely on corporativist mediations with unions and national 
business associations, as these became secondary or even redundant within the new economic 
model; neither do they seem preoccupied in building their own parties; and in contrast to the 
former populist regimes, labour rights are not central to the maintenance of the alliance 
sustaining the regime. Changing such a legacy and rebuilding a democratically-propitious 
context will take high amounts of energy and clearer democratic affinities both from elites and 
the common citizenry. 
 
                                                
89 It was Guillermo O’Donnell who coined this expression to describe a political situation where the citizenry opts 
for a rather passive participatory attitude vis a vis political elites. In a delegative democracy, the accountability 
dimension of the regime is very weak and the citizenry assumes that the vote expresses all of its elective affinity 
towards institutions (O’Donnell, 1992). 
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countries, have broken down even to the point of violent conflict while others have not. Our work 
asks whether processes of globalisation have precipitated or helped to avoid crisis and social 
breakdown. 
Research Objectives 
 
 We will assess how constellations of power at local, national and global levels drive 
processes of institutional change, collapse and reconstruction and in doing so will challenge 
simplistic paradigms about the beneficial effects of economic and political liberalisation. 
 
 We will examine the effects of international interventions promoting democratic reform, 
human rights and market competition on the ‘conflict management capacity’ and production and 
distributional systems of existing polities.  
 
 We will analyse how communities have responded to crisis, and the incentives and moral 
frameworks that have led either toward violent or non-violent outcomes.  
 
 We will examine what kinds of formal and informal institutional arrangements poor 
communities have constructed to deal with economic survival and local order. 
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